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Genocide in Rwanda:
Documentation of Two Massacres
during April 1994

November 1994

This report is based on a U.S. Committee for Refugees site visit to Rwanda in August-September
1994. The documentation was gathered, and this report was written, by David Hawk, an expert on
documentation of genocide. Hawk is former U.S. Executive Director of Amnesty International,
and Associate of the Center for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. He has had
years of experience documenting Khmer Rouge massacres of civilians in Cambodia, and has led
efforts to bring those responsible to justice. He was assisted by Joan Kakwinzere, professor of
history at Makerere University, a human rights professional, and long-term member of Uganda's
Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuse.
This report was edited by Virginia Hamilton and produced by Koula Papanicolas of the U.S.
Commitee for Refugees.

Preface
How do you massacre a million people in three weeks? Rwanda gives a real life answer.
Those in authority plan and oversee. Those in the ranks butcher. Both together are guilty of anationwide matrix of nearly simultaneous local Hutu actions to extenninate their Thtsi neighbors and
compatriots in April1994.
I saw the results of genocide up close, in nwnerous locations such as Nyamata and Musaza
I've seen a lot in my professional life; I've never seen anything that remotely looks like this.
The UN, the United States, the entire world failed Rwanda and Rwandans in their most fateful hour. To this very moment, many continue to whitewash what happened in the most effective

genocide since the Holocaust. To this very moment, the world stands back from the victims and survivors while pouring aid into the hands of refugee camp leaders who are the criminal perpetrators of
genocide, pledged to return to Rwanda to finish the job.
The international machinery for holding at least some accountable, to break the cycle of
impunity that has infected Rwanda, is now beginning to creak into operation. The jury is still out on
the seriousness of the effort. In the world's eyes, Rwanda is not a very important place.
This report attempts in a small way to summarize the dynamics of genocide in two specific
locations. It names names. It is illustrative of the kind of documentation that needs to be produced
at sites all over Rwanda. It is the only way to retain an accurate moral compass, to clarify the victims and the victimizers.
Every young soldier in Rwanda's new anny has seen the genocide up close. Most have lost
all or most of their own families. If there is ever to be a coherent Rwanda again, this kind of documentation must be acted on, and all those found guilty punished. If this does not happen soon, vigilante justice will reign, repatriation of the innocent will be impossible, and additional, perhaps regional, war will be inevitable.

Roger P. Wmter, Director
U.S. Committee for Refugees

A Genocide in Rwanda

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) has
long monitored the situation of Rwandan refugees and reported on the explosive political siruation in Rwanda that threatened even larger
refugee outflows. 1 Following the post-April 6
eruption of massive and systematic massacres
against the Thtsi ettmic minority in Rwanda, USCR
published a series of advocacy Action Alerts on the
Rwanda crisis.
The second Action Alert, on June 27,
1994, stressed the importance of imposing accountability for the massacres. That Alert noted
that "thorough documentation of the atrocities
in Rwanda is required to begin the difficult process of healing Rwandan society and to educate
the world that genocide occurred while the
world watched." That report warned that ''failure to impose accountability in a public manner
will allow many culpable military, political, and
militia leaders to escape and will send a dangerous signal worldwide-particularly to Burundi,
where the potential for organized violence remains high" and recommended that the "international community should accelerate efforts to
document the massacres and identify the main
planners and leaders of the killings in order to
bring them to justice."
Subsequent USCR testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs again stressed the urgency of documenting the Rwandan genocide in
order to bring guilty individuals to justice and
send a warning that such acts will be punished
by the world community. That testimony noted
Administration support for a tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda,
and urged U.S. officials to assist this process by
providing immediate diplomatic, financial, and
logistical support to human rights investigators.2
To contribute to international accountability for those responsible for the Rwandan
genocide, USCR sent two human rights experts
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to Rwanda in August and September to undertake an in depth documentation of two massacre
sites and to assess the adequacy of measures being taken to monitor human rights and initiate
legal proceedings at the international level for
those responsible for the Rwanda genocide and
other grave violations of international humanitarian law.
The main difficulty encountered by
USCR researchers was in deciding which victim
and survivor accounts to record. The killings
took place throughout the country and everywhere there were witnesses and/or suiVivors.
Behind the front-lines in the civil war between
the Rwandan government and the rebel
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), political killings and massive slaughters against members of
Rwanda Tutsi ethnic minority were carried out
by anny units, civilian police, and mobs or militia organized by the government These killings
took place in neighbmhoods throughout
Rwanda, as government-directed militiamen attacked the homes of Tutsi residents. Killings
took place at police- and militia-manned roadside checkpoints where ethnicity-specific, stateissued identity cards were used to identify minority groups members. Larger scale massacres
took place at public buildings (churches, stadiums, hotels) to which the Tutsi had fled in hopes
of finding safety and protection. This USCR report describes the sequence of events at two different churches, chosen virtually at random, to
which neighborhood Tutsi had sought sanctuary: one in the capital of Kigali and another in a
rural area in eastern Rwanda
These investigations were conducted
under difficult logistical circumstances. Neither
the capital city of Kigali nor the provincial
towns or villages visited by USCR had electricity, telephones, or running water. Securing
transportation, finding food, were time consuming and remarkably expensive. Once the inves-

tigators located the survivor of a particular massacre, he or she would identify another wimess
who could be interviewed. But it took days, and
often several trips, to track down and locate that
wimess.
All wimesses were interviewed separately. Other than examining the consistency of
multiple sources of information for the same
event, USCR investigators had no way to verify
independently the information provided by the
survivors and eye wimesses interviewed. Nor
was our purpose to undertake the kind of investigations required of a national or international prosecutor. The massacres we are reporting on will undoubtedly appear as
one-line or one-sentences items, along with
hundreds of other massacres, in official account-

ings of the Rwandan genocide
Our purpose, rather, is to publish the
stories these survivors, none of whom spoke English, told us. Their narratives show that these
killings were conducted openly, in broad daylight, by Rwandans who had been organized by
the State to kill their neighbors. As a result, we
have frequently included the names of perpetrators recognized and identified by their intended
victims.
This report describes the measures currently underway to brwg remedy and redress for
these terrible crimes, and the still urgent necessity for ongoing monitoring of the human rights
situation in Rwanda-one of the measures necessary to enable the vast numbers of new
Rwandan refugees to return home.

Victims of the massacre at Gahini, a jew miles from Rukara parish, where the USCR team did
documentation. The photograph was taken only days after the massacre.
Photo: Father Oswald Rudakemwa
•
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I. THE APRIL MASSACRES IN
GIKONDOCHURCH,KIGALI

Gikondo

demonstrates the
determination of
the perpetrators
to thoroughly
eliminate the
targeted minority
group.

The June 28, 1994, Report of the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on
Rwanda, Mr. Degni-Sequi, cited a massacre outside the parish church at Gikondo, an industrial
section of the capital of Kigali, where ''the street
was covered with corpses the length of a kilometer."3
Those bodies were the results of the
killings of Thtsi residing in several "hills;' also
called "cells" (cellules)4 that comprise the
Gikondo "sector" of one of the three "communes" that make up Rwanda's capital city of
KigaJi
According to the testimony of survivors at Gikondo, the killings were committed by
politically organized mobs operating under the
direction of an elite military unit of the anned
forces of the former Rwandan government
called the Presidential Guard.
Near the crest of the hill, next to the
road cited by the UN Special Rapporteur as
having been littered with corpses, is a barbed
wire fence with several metal gates enclosing
an ecclesiastical "mission station" run by the
Pallotine missionary order of the Catholic
church. The Pallotine mission, staffed by a
dozen Polish priests and nuns, is a small,
self-contained campus with a large church
capable of holding up to 2,000 thousand worshipers, a small chapel suitable for private
prayers, a cultural or community center, a
large print shop with an adjoining warehouse,
an administrative building, and several separate housing quarters for resident priests and

nuns.
The following is an account of the
massacre inside the mission. This massacre,
while small compared with the more extensive
killings in the general neighborhood, is a particulariy appropriate and useful potential body
of evidence in the event of national or international legal proceedings against those responsible for these killings. Gikondo demonstrates
the determination of the perpetrators to thoroughly eliminate the targeted minority group.
Further, the easily attainable evidence includes
Rwandan survivor accounts, UN and other foreign eyewitness accounts, photographs of some
of the wounded and dead taken by a UN eyewitness, and an on-site mass grave.
•
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A Survivor's Account

~~~~~~-------------

According to Mr. Emmanuel Musonera, a 37year-old Thtsi, one of the two known survivors
of the massacre inside the church, the situation
in Gikondo sector was already tense prior to the
April 6 plane crash that killed Rwandan President Habyarimana. Several weeks earlier, there
had been random killings of Tutsi in Gikondo
following the assassination of M. Bucyana, a
leader of the extremist Hutu political party, the
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
(CDR).
Following the airplane crash of April 6,
Musonera, who was residing with his family in
Kigarama cell, one of the hills in Gikondo sector, heard shootings all night long, but he did not
yet know what was going on. The following
morning, April 7, Musonera saw several Presidential Guards in his neighborhood. He asked
an officer what was happening. The officer replied that he didn't know either, but told
Musonera to wait there. A corporal in the Presidential Guard, not knowing Musonera 's
ethnicity, told him that it was time to kill Thtsi. 5
A military taxi arrived and took the soldiers away. But as the Presidential Guards departed, a mob of Impusamugmi militiamen6 arrived in his neighborhood, evidently knowing
which residents were Tutsi. Musonera saw the
mob attack and kill a Tutsi neighbor named
GeiVais and his family. So Musonera and his
family quickly hid nearby in a primary school
ooinpound, from where he could obseiVe a group
of Impusamugmi enter and ransack his home.
After the mob left, Musonera and his
family emerged from hiding. He pretended that
his child was sick, and set off to seek shelter and
protection at the Gikondo church. He passed
numerous roadblocks manned by gendarmes,
the local police force, along the way. Not recognizable as a Tutsi, he was able to convince the
police that he was taking his sick child to the
Gikondo mission infirmary. When he arrived at
the church, late morning on Thursday, April 7,
several score of Tutsi from Gikondo sector were
already there. More would come during the
next two days. Several hundred Thtsi were sheltered in various buildings on the church
grounds, some more securely hidden in "crawl
spaces" beneath floors or roofs, others more
simply, inside various buildings .

~

Emmanuel Musonera, one of two known survivors of the massacre in Gikondo Church, Kigali
Photo: USCRID. Hawk
On Saturday, April9, around 9:00a.m.,

the priests asked the approximately 500 Tutsi
gathered in the compound--many, if not most of
whom were regular or frequent congregates or
worshipers at this church--to gather in the main
chapel for a worship sexvice. During the mass,
the worshipers heard shootings, grenade explosions, and a commotion outside the church.
These were probably the killings of sector residents who had been rounded up from the neighborhood and brought to the road outside the
church grounds for execution and whose bodies
were obsexved the next day "littering the street"
After the mass, the worshipers remained inside the church. 7 The next thing they
knew, four officers (two Presidential Guard and
two local police) entered the church, followed
by some hundred or more Interhamwe militiamen8 anned with machetes and clubs. The militiamen began slashing away--hacking at the
anns, legs, genitals, breasts, faces and necks--at
the unarmed, terrorized and panic-stricken worshipers trapped inside the church. Some were
killed inside the church. Others were dragged
outside and beaten to death in the small courtyard in front of the church. In the confusion and
melee of the bloodletting, an unquantifiable
number of the Tutsi were also able to run out of
the church and hide elsewhere on the church

compound. The murders went on for two hours,
.as the militiamen circulated among the
wounded to finish them off.
Musonera was robbed of his money
and shoes, then slashed on his ear, face, and
head. The deep cut across his mouth and cheek
bled profusely. At first, he feigned death. Later,
he was able to run outside and hide behind some
bushes across from the entrance to the church.
From their unifonns, he could identify two of
the officers as Presidential guards and two local
police.
Musonera also recognized several of
the killers. The mob was lead by Jean
Ntawutagirpfa, also known as "Congolais," the
head of the Gikondo sector lnterhamwe.
Musonera also recognized Bernard Rwajekare,
whom he knew to be a CDR member, and
Alphonse Kakizimana, a Hutu who had come
from Byumba and who had worked as a gardener at Gikondo church.

Several hundred
Tutsiwere
sheltered in
various buildings
on the church
grounds, some
more securely
hidden in "crawl
spaces" beneath
floors or roofs,
others more
simply, inside
various buildings.

Eyewibtess and Corroborating Accounts
Some of the kiliings described by Musonera were
witnessed by two officers ofthe UN peacekeeping
operation for Rwanda, Major Jerzy Macza and
Major Chudy Ryszard. 9 To share the company of
•
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Based on his own
observations,
Maczka saw clear
cooperation and, in
fact, a division of
labor between the
local police and the
militia in the
Gikondo church.
The police searched
for the Tutsi and
used their authority
to gain entrance and
open the door for the
mobs who did the
actual killing.

The court yard and front door of the church at Gikondo. This is the location where Major
Maczka observed killings.
Photo: USCRID. Hawk

the Polish priests and nuns at the Gikondo mission,
the two Polish UNAMIR officers resided at the
chw:-ch while off duty. Coincidentally, they were
on the church grounds when the killings began,
and they saw some of what happened before they
were ordered to leave the church grounds and
return to UNAMIR headquarters on April 10.
Also present, .of course, were the foreign priest and nuns, the members of the
Pallotine religious order, who ran the mission
complex at Gikondo. Following yet another
massacre at Gikondo church on April 12,
UNAMIR came with armored personnel carriers and evacuated the Pallotines on April 13.
Father Filipek Stanislas, one of the priests
present during the killings onApril9, organized
the digging of the mass grave on April 10, and
was also on the church grounds during the subsequent April 12 killings at the Chapel. By the
time of the USCR mission to Rwanda in August, Father Stanislas had returned to Kigali.
While he did not personally see the actual murders themselves, his testimony amplifies, in important ways, the accounts of Major Maczka
and Emmanuel Musonera. 10
According to Father Stanislas, on the
morning of April 9, a group of local police first
entered the church grounds.. They killed a person at the door of the church, claiming that the
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person had a grenade. The priest came over to
talk to the local police, who claimed further that
the church and church grounds were harboring
Inkotanyi, Tutsi supporters of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, and that they had to search for them.
The priests claimed that those present
were Christian worshipers, oot the local police
continued to insist that they search the premises
and examine the identity papers of the
Rwandans present at the church. Some of the
police remained at the main church itself, while
others left the area directly in Hunt of the
church. Then the militia appeared, threatened
and pushed the priests away, entered the church,
and began the beatings and killings, which Father Stanislas said went on for two hours.
UNAMIR Major Maczka was about 70
meters from the main church. He saw the local
police begin to enter the various buildings in the
mission complex. ffe saw a group of about 60
militia armed with machetes, clubs, and what
appeared to be one Kalishnikov climb over the
fence surrounding the church complex and
swarm over the area. For 10 or 15 minutes, he
saw people being pulled out of the church and
clubbed and slashed in front of the church. 11
After 15 minutes, the militia came back outside
the church and clubbed the wounded there to
death.

During the massacres, Major Maczka
attempted to contact UNAMIR headquarters on
his walkie-talkie, but because the channels were
occupied, he could not get through. After the
carnage, and after the militia and local police
had withdrawn from the church, Majors Maczka
and Ryszard helped the priests care for the
wounded. Maczka had a camera with several
frames left on the roll of film inside. He photographed two of the wounded, Musonera, whose
face was badly gouged and swollen, and another
woman, Mrs. Theodosie. Several other photographs showed a score of bodies strewn in front
of the church. The following day, Major
Maczka was ordered back to UNAMIR headquarters.
Based on his own obsetvations, Maczka
saw clear cooperation and, in fact, a division of labor betWeen the local police and the militia in the
Gikondo church. The police searched for the
Tutsi and used their authority to gain entrance
and open the door for the mobs who did the actual
killing.
According to Father Stanislas, the murders were prepared and premeditated. They
were also vicious and cruel. From the wounds
on the dead bodies, it was apparent that the ears
and mouths had been particularly slashed;
clothes were pulled off and genitals mutilated
on both men and women.
The priests tended the wounded and
helped some of the sUIVivors escape the premises through a small gate at the back of the
mission complex away from the front and side
roads. They tried to persuade the SUIVivors to
leave because the priests could not protect them.
Some did. About 20 others did not, preferring
to continue to hide under floor boards, in crawl
spaces between ceilings and roofs, and in the
small, private chapel.
Musonera was evacuated by Medecins
Sans Frontiers (MSF) staff, who took him to the
hospital at Giterama. He again feared for his
life as they passed several highway road blocks
manned by lnterhamwe, but MSF managed to
get him through.
According to Major Moczka, the Red
Cross came that afternoon, but said there were
too many bodies to take them away. The priests
dug a huge but shallow hole in an area adjacent
to the courtyard in front of the church and buried most of the dead. Seventy-seven bodies
were buried that Saturday, including those of

eleven children. Father Stanislas also saw garbage trucks pull up outside the church, and prisoners from the city jail loading the bodies on the
road just outside the church. According to Major Moczka, another 25 bodies that were found
at various places on the mission ground were
buried the next day. Many of the identity cards
of the dead had been taken by the local police
when they first entered the church. They were
strewn about amidst other paper and piles of
ruble from the carnage. The identity cards were
not collected again or preserved by the priests.
There is no way now to determine the names of
the dead.
Worse, the killing had not ended. The
priests tried to persuade the sutvivors of
Saturday's massacre to leave the mission
grounds because they were unable to guarantee
their security. But one mother with children
said to the priests, "Father, if we must die, let us
die here." And so they did. Roughly 20 persons
remained on the mission grounds, 10 or 12 were
housed in the small, one-room brick chapel,
about 50 yards from the main church. The
priests quietly brought food to them during the
night, hoping no one would know that people
were still hidden there. But somehow, word got
out. · According to Father Stanislas, Radio
RTLM, the extremist radio station run by members of fonner President Habyarimana 's political party, announced that the church was still
harboring the lnkotanyi (supporters of the RPF).
Four days later, on the afternoon of
April 12, approximately 100 Interhamwe entered the church grounds and demanded the
keys to the chapel. The metal door to the chapel
had been locked from the inside, and according
to Father Stanislas, the priests did not have keys.
The Interhamwe tried without success to shoot
the lock and otheiWise break down the door.
Failing that, the mob broke the narrow windows, poured gasoline into the roughly 12' by
12' room, threw in grenades, the explosion of
which caused fires, burning to death the 10 to 12
people who had locked themselves inside.
The mob went through the other building on the mission ground, and beat seven persons who were found hiding in the building adjacent to the print shop. Four died immediately.
Three more were heavily wounded. The priests
brought water and tried to treat their wounds.
But they died the following morning.
1be next morning, April 13, lnterhamwe
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The burnt interior of the little chapel
at Gikondo where 12 people burned to
death.
Photo: USCR/D. Hawk

also returned. They saw the bloodstained
clothes on the priest who had treated the
wounded and threateningly accused the priests
of sheltering and assisting the Tutsi who were
supposed to be killed. Angered, the mob set
fires to cars on the church grounds and began
ransacking and robbing the health and community center, saying that there were still Inkotanyi
inside. Now fearing for their lives, the priests
contacted UNAMIR, and at 5:00 p.m., the UN
peacekeepers evacuated the priests and nuns.
The church buildings were further damaged by
warfare when the RPF captured Kigali. Following the end of the war, some of the priests returne-d from Poland, and began to reopen the
mission. In August, when the U.S. Committee
for Refugees mission initially investigated this
particular massacre, the acrid stench of death remained, as did some skeletal remains in the
chapel's antechamber.
Concluding Note
In it~ essentials, the Gikondo church massacre
does not differ from scores of such massacres
that took place throughout Rwanda in April
1994, including the one described below at
Rukara parish. Even so, the April 9-12 killings
at the Pallotine mission station at Gikondo
should be a prime case in any international legal
p~..edings that might be instituted for the

a
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Rwandan genocide: first, in making the legal
case that acts of genocide were comrniu:ed, and
second, regarding any individual indictments
that might be brought against the identifiable
and recognizable leaders of the Gikondo sector
Interhamwe. (Father Stanislas is certain he
could recognize some of the Interhamwe leaders
of the Gikondo sector.)
At Gikondo, there is an articulate, credible suiVivor, Mr. Musonera, whose wounds
were photographed by a UN official. Perllaps,
with more time, the prosecutors can locate the
other photographed wounded survivor, Mrs.
Theodosie. According to Musonera, the daughter of Charles Karera witnessed and suiVived the
killings on the road outside the fenC(!. The
USCR mission of August-September could not
locate her. But reportedly, she continue:s to reside in Gikondo sector, and probably she:: can be
found and can clarify those events. There were
the two UNAMIR eyewitnesses, who photographed some of the wounded and dead within
hours of the killings. There were an ample
number of foreign priests and nuns, who did not
wimess the killings, but who were present on
the mission grounds during the massacres and
treated the wounded and buried the dead. Only
one of these had returned to Kigali at the time of
the USCR investigation. But the others are easy
to locate in Poland. Should forensic pathologists need to exhume remains, the mass grave
exists next to the church.

Almost certainly there were employment records of the local police--the gendarmes
who opened the doors for the militia--for
Gikondo sector; whether these records can be
found is an open question. The identifiable killers are either living elsewhere in Rwanda, perhaps with an assumed name, or more probably
in one of the refugee camps outside Rwanda
stili under the control of the former government.
Whether indicnnents or arrest warrants could
ever be drawn up or served is a matter for future
prosecutors to determine.
But the murders at Gikondo church are
clearly genocidal massacres, not simply political
killings. Like elsewhere in Rwanda, the Tutsi of
Gikondo sector fled to the church to escape the
eruption of house to house killings in their
neighborhoods--thinking they could find
safety in the religious places where they had
formerly worshiped with their Hutu neighbors until the killing spree had passed, as had
previously happened during earlier outbreaks
of ethnic violence against the Tutsi minority
group.

That was not to be the case this time.
From the testimony of Rwandan survivors and
foreign eyewitnesses, it is clear that the politically organized mob that carried out the killings
(which were not without ritualized and brutal
mutilation, as well as petty thievery) was working in concert, indeed guided by, military and
police agents acting under the authority of the
Rwandan state. That neither the police initially
or the I nterhamwe mobs subsequently could be
dissuaded by the foreign priests from carrying
out their work shows how clear and firm their
orders must have been.
That the Gikondo sector militiamen repeatedly returned again to search the premises
to make sure they had left no Tutsi still alive indicates the intention to destroy in whole, and not
even in part--literally, to finish off physically-the ethnically Tutsi residents of that area All of
this was done in broad daylight, without any attempt whatsoever to disguise the identity of the
perpetrators, indicating that there was absolutely
no perceived moral, legal, or political sanction
against what they were doing.

The mass grave at Gikondo Church. Photo: USCRID. Hawk
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ll. THE MASSACRES AT RUKARA
PMUSHCHURCH,KmUNGO
PREFECTURE

In between sprees
of murder, the
killers paused to
chat with their victims, kill and roast
the cows the Tutsi
cattlemen had
brought with them,
and regularly
retreat for rest.

In contrast to the killings at Gikondo described
above, the massacres at Rukara, a rural commune and sector in Kibungo Prefecture (province) were much larger, more drawn out, and
more complex--initially irresolute, even haphazard, yet in the end, even more savage and grotesque. Again, militia attacks on Tutsi in their
hom,es along the hillsides immediately following the downing of President Habyarimana 's
plane drove several thousand Tutsi, most of
whom were fanners or cattlemen, to a sprawling, isolated mission complex on a high plateau
above one of the fingers of Lake Muhazi. Some
of the cattle traders brought their small herds
with them. The Thtsi from Rukara commune
first encamped, then hid, in a dozen different
buildings within the church complex, where
they had previously worshiped and gone to
school with their Hutu neighbors. On at least
four occasions, the Hutu Burgrneister (the local
mayor), sometimes accompanied by the local
Men1ber of Parliament from this area, came to
the church to talk to the Tutsi who had sought
sanctuary there.
After robbing the homes of the fleeing
Thtsil, the local lnterhamwe mobs repeatedly
came to Rukara parish church where they took
ten days to kill off most of their fonner Tutsi
neighbors. In between sprees of murder, the
killers paused to chat with their victims, kill and
roast the cows the Tutsi cattlemen had brought
with them, and regularly retreat for rest. The
mob taunted the richest Tutsi by name as they
hid inside church buildings, argued over which
Thtsil, if any, should be spared, and frequently
left the church compound to get more ammunition or soldiers to assist them before returning,
singing and whistling, for another round of
mass murder.
The foreign priests and nuns at Rukara
parish were evacuated a third of the way
through the April killings. As of August, they
had not returned except for one visit by the
fonner head priest, and were not available at the
time of the USCR mission to provide nonR wandan corroboration.
The slaughter of
Rukara commune's Tutsi population ended
when the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) captured the area on April 16. The bodies of the
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dead were collected and cremated, reportedly
inside the church buildings, but not befbre foreign journalists had visited the scene and photographed some of the carnage. But there is now
no way to verify independently the nurnber of
deaths. And some elements of this story do not
entirely hang together. However, the survivor
accounts are remarkably consistent The executioners knew many of their victims. .And the
survivors readily identify those who led lhe killings and many who participated. Following is a
summary reconstruction of their accounts.
Rukara commune12 is located in
Kibungo prefecture, 13 roughly an hour :and fifteen minutes by car due east and slightly north
of the capital of Kigali. Most of the way, the
road is paved. But at Lake Muhazi, a laterite
road goes up a considerable hill, past a large
hospital complex at Gahini. From there, one
lane, dirt roads extend deeper into an agricultural plateau. Rukara has a town square with
detached houses stretching around a green the
size of a soccer field. But like the rest of
R wan<ll4 there are not what people ofien consider to be rural villages, a cluster of huts or
houses centering around a church or school or
public building. As in the rest of Rwanda, the
Rukara commune is composed of cellules
(cells), in reality, one among many rolling
"hills" on which houses are scattered., surrounded by very small plots of land for famrlng
(mostly bananas and beans) or small plots of grass
or scrub land suitable for grazing small herds of
cattle. People get around mostly on foot or by bicycle, with occasional cars or pick-up trucks.
Ten or fifteen minutes by car firom the
hospital complex at Gahini is exactly what one
might visualize as a European mission station in
central Africa: Paroisse, or Parish, Rukara. The
unenclosed mission stretches along a road, perhaps a half-mile in length, perpendicular to two
other roads. At the intersection of one of the
petpendicular roads there are quarters for the
nuns and a cemetery. At the other end, there is a
dispensary, or medical facility. Along tne road
that runs in between, there are several school
buildings, a three-room maternity facility, a
church and adjoining office building, a nearby
one-room building used as a recreation room,
and several other scattered buildings. Behind
the recreation hall, is a small rabbit hutch.
According
to
Sister Veneranda
Murekatete, a thirty-year-old Rwandan who was

Bodies outside ofRukllraparish. Photo: Cathy Watson

born at Rukara and who spent four years as a
nun at Rukara Parish, the mission complex was
run by the Spanish-based Missionary Order of
the Sacred Heart of Jesus and Mary. The chief
priests were Father Santos and Father Melchior.
The head nuns were Sister Maria-Louisa Ariaga
and Sister Terese Canavese. The Spanish nuns
and priests were evacuated to Barcelona, but
Sister Veneranda believes that some of them
may now be in the refugee camps in Zaire or
Tanzania.

The Trouble Starts
Mr. Gerald Gasherebuka, a 54-year-old Tutsi
school teacher who had been living in Rukara
for 27 years, says that the Hutu and Tutsi had
lived together in that area "without problems."
Before December 1993, people lived amicably
and "shared beer." After that, though, he noticed Hutu youth withdrawing, drinking beer by
themselves. Some of the youth wings of the
Hutu political parties were learning how to
shoot, and separated themselves from others in
the community. And in March, a Hutu friend
named Rukul asked him, oddly he thought, if
the Tutsi of Muzizi cell were planning to kill the
Hutu of Kinunga cell.

Others were more suspicious. Andrew
Kabarira, a Tutsi, moved back to Rukara in
early March 1994 because political unrest in
Kigali had resulted in the closing of the factory
where he worked. But it wasn't secure in
Rukara either. According to Kabarira, the youth
wings of the MNRD and the CDR had come
into Rukara by bus to hold political rallies
where they would speak against the Thtsi and
against the moderate Hutu political opposition
such as the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party. After these rallies, the youth would
rough up some Tutsi (including himself,
Kabarira relates) and other Hutu whom they
would see wearing the distinctive hats of the opposition parties.
Sister Veneranda also expected trouble.
Ever since the political parties began, she had
noticed Hutu beginning to keep a distance from
their fonner Tutsi friends. There was munnuring about the killing of Tutsi. Sister Veneranda
now believes that the Hutu had been infonned
that they would have to kill the Tutsi, but they
didn't know when. Indeed, some Hutu would
openly say that "the government had delayed
giving the orders to kill the Tutsi." But, according to her, "the Thtsi didn't believe" that there
could be such orders.
Sometime around April 6 or 7, some-
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body gave the orders. The murderous sewch for
Thtsi in Ruara commune began the day following the attack on President Habyarimana 's
plane. That day, a Hutu police officer in Rukara
told nurse Immaculate Muakmurigo that the attack on the plane never would have happened if
they had finished off the Thtsi earlier. And as
elsewhere in Rwanda, it began with militiamen
of the two ruling Hutu extremist parties sc:~h
ing through the neighborhoods, looking for
Tutsi in their homes. On Wednesday nigh1t, Andrew Kabarira saw smoke and fires on the hillsides in the direction of Murambi. Mid-day on
Thursday, April 7, Kabarira saw two of his
neighbors at Mitundo cell, Mr. Senturo Viateur
and a Mr. Nkeramugaba, killed by a group of
alx>Ut 30 militiamen. 14 Kabarira told his wife
and children to run to Rukara parish, two or
three kilometers away, while he packed some
clothes. When he started to leave, he saw that
his neighborhood was sunounded by militiamen, so he hid in thick bushes near his home.
From there, he could see the militiamen who
killed his neighbors, and other bands of n1ilitia
looting and taking the metal roofs off of houses
frorr.t which Tutsi had fled. His neighbors took
off his roof and doors, then knocked his house
down. (After Kibirira hid for two days in these
bushes, a friendly Responsible--the title of the
leadilng local public official for a cell--Mr.
Gakwisi of Buyonza cell, saw him, gave him
water, and urged him to go to Rukara parish at
5:00 am. the next day, where he was able to rejoin his family.)
On Thursday, the day after the plane
crash, Mr. John Mari-Vienney Butera, a 41yea.r--old cattle herdsman, saw people, including
wounded people, fleeing from the direction of
Mirnmbe. These people told him that Thtsi had
been attacked all night long. Butera feared the
pattern of killing would reach his house. He
wanted to flee to the forests, but was afraid that
Interhamwe had the roads to the forests covered.
So he went to Rukara parish, bringing his cattle
wilth him, as others did. Ms. Angelique Jolie
U1nurungi, a 22-year-old, lived only a kilorneter
from the chun;h. On Thursday, April 7, around
5:00 p.m., she saw a group of militia headed in
the direction of her house, so she hid all night in
the bushes. On Friday, she ran to the parish recreation room, where she had often gone before
to watch videos. Another 22-year-old, Ms.
Otantal Kayisinga went to the maternity ward
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Gerald Gashebebuka, a survivor of the
massacres at Rukara parish.
Photo: USCRID. Hawk

because her aunt was a midwife there.
Other swvivors described their flight to
the parish on Friday. Mr. Gerald Gashebebuka
says the killings started at Gahini sector on
April 7. On Friday, April 8, many Thtsi from
Rukara sector and Kawangire sector arrived at
Rukara parish. He also saw people coming
from Rwinkuba cell, where he could see houses
burning. On Friday, Sister Veneranda took a
parish car and traveled to her family's house in
Rukara. Her Thtsi neighbors, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel and their five children, had been killed.
So Sister Veneranda took her own family back to
the parish, where she put them in the maternity
ward. Nurse Immaculee Rukamurigo was already at the parish dispensary. On Friday afternoon, she was already treating the wounded
transfening the worst cases to the hospital a~
Gahini. Her family joined her at Rukara parish,
as large numbers of others began to arrive as
well.
Many of the Tutsi who came to Rukara
parish were worshipers there. Others were Protestants. And ~some, according to Sister Veneranda,
were nonworshipers. Irrespective of what was
happening in the cells and sectors from which
they had fled, by all accounts, they thought they
would be safe at the church. The Thtsi from
around Rukara commune camped out around

the sprawling mission station. They e:en
thought that the responsible Rwandan officials
for the commune would provide for their protection. Nonetheless, sensing themselves to be
several thousand in number, some of the men
vowed they would resist, should the Interhamwe
come there to attack them.
The most immediate concern of some
of those present was the well-being of the several hundred or more cattle that some of the
Thtsi had brought with them. The cows had not
been watered or fed, and were becoming restless and noisy. Reportedly, the Burgmeister, the
highest commune level official, had already
come to Rukara parish on Friday. They asked
him about water for their cattle, but he belittled
their concern. ''The question of the cows is no
question at all," he told them. That was certain! y the case, as the course of events unfolded.
A band of Interhamwe militia came to
Rukara parish between 2:00p.m. and 3:00p.m.
on Saturday afternoon. The Tutsi men, some
carrying the spears and clubs they had brought
with them, came out of the buildings on the
road, stood their ground, and faced off the militia The militiamen retreated--or, rather, they
left to get weapons, and came back in larger
number around 5:00p.m., this time with grenades in hand. Using their grenades, the
Interhamwe attacked, killing eleven. They
drove the Tutsi defenders into the church buildings. According to Gasherebuka, those who
threw the grenades included Paul Mujyambere
and John Bosco Rukundo.
The militia then drove away the cattle.
According to virtually all the survivor accounts,
the Interhamwe then feasted for two days on the
Thtsi 's cows, 15 and did not return to the parish
grounds on Sunday or Monday. During this
time, Father Santos and others present at the
parish, including Andrew Kabarira, buried
the eleven in the cemetery at the mission
complex.
Nothing happened during the day on
Monday, other than consultations between Father Santos and the Burgmeister at the Bukara
commune headquarters. In any event, those at
the Parish related that Father Santos came and
told them that the Burgmeister had said he
would send police to guard the people at the
parish. A policeman did come around 3:00p.m.
to deliver a message that people should go home
and that nothing would happen to them. But

Andrew Kabarira, a survivor of the RJl]aua
parish massacres. Photo: USCRID. Hawk
they were not convinced, and preferred to remain at the parish.
Around 6:00 p.m., a larg~ group of
Interhamwe came and attacked them, again using grenades, and again forcing people to retreat
inside the church buildings. Those at the church
itself barricaded the doors and windows so that
the Interhamwe could not get in. According to
Kabarira, a pick-up truck belonging to the commune and driven by a Member of Parliament,
Mr. Karibwende, delivered a truck load of
stones. The Interhamwe managed to break
some of the church windows and attempted
throughout the night to throw stones and grenades through the broken windows. The attacks
continued until dawn. Those inside the church
counted 35 dead, mostly from the grenades
tossed in through the small openings in the broken windows. At daybreak, the Interhamwe
shouted out that, after getting some rest, they
would come back to finish the attack.
Those inside the church buildings came
outside and tried to cook breakfast for the children. Early Tuesday morning, a distraught Father Santos went to see the Prefect (the equivalent of a governor) at Kibungo, not to return
until months later.
According to Sister
Veneranda, Father Santos was overwhelmed because some of his most important parishioners-catechists, choir members, lay officials--were
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John Mam··Vienney Butera, survivor ofthe
Rukera parish massacre.
Photo: USCR/D. Hawk

killing their neighbors and follller fellow-worshipers at his, and their, church. 16
The Interhamwe did return at around
11 :00 a.m. and, true to their word, renewc~ the
attack, which continued sporadically until late
tltat afternoon. The dead inside the church,
mostly killed by exploding grenades, were now
so many that the swvivors stopped counting.
And at that point, those who had barricaded themselves inside tlhe main church lost contact witth the
other groups of people around the parish.
Late Tuesday afternoon, the Bwg1neister
returned to the parish, accompanied by govennnent
soldiers. He tried to convince those barricaded
inside the church building and recreation hall
that the had no authority or control over the
Interhamwe. He told people to leave and find
other places for their security. No ·one believed
hilm, and the hidden people called out to him to
provide for their protection The Burgm.eister
left All of the swvivors from Rukara interviewed by USCR were convinced that the
Burgmeister and government soldiers were
worldng hand. in hand with, and in fact were directing, the lnterhamwe militiamen.
Early Thesday evening, the militia returned, but this time concentrated on the recreation hall just down the road, where they commitW..d a terrible massacre. But that was not
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quick or easy either. Like the main church, the
recreation building was a one-story, brick structure with a few small windows and a small
metal door. The militia pried away a portion of
the metal sheet roofing. They threw in grenades, killing many inside. On the outside, they
continued to try to break the door. In the middle
of the night, they succeeded in breaking through
the bricks on one side of tht: door frame, 17 and
thus were able to open the door. According to
Ms. Angelique Umurungi 's testimony, about 30
lnterhamwe entered the room and proceeded to
slaughter nearly one thousand persons, while
those outside shouted the names of those who
should be killed--mostly the wealthier Tutsi.
Because of the grenades exploding inside the enclosed space, those hiding inside
were too terrified to react, according to Ms.
Umurgungi. The killers moved about, hacking
and beating people to death. They then poured
gasoline about and started fires. Those who
then tried to run outside through the now open
door to escape the fires were killed outside.
r:~~gi claims that of a thousand persons
hiding m the recreation building, only ten survived: those who, like herself, had smeared
themselves with blood and crawled under
corpses.
One thousand is a very approximate
round number. If there were that many in the
recreation room, it was extremely crowded. But
much more important in telllls of evidence of
genocide, and far worse than the actual number,
w~tever it was, is the mutilation that Angelique
testifies to have personally witnessed: her
mother's head beaten so savagely it came off her
neck, after which her killers-a Mr. Rukundo
and a Mr. Minani--kicked the decapitated head
remarking that the woman had not even
out.
After spending much of Monday night
attacking the main church building, renewing
the fight there on Tuesday during the day, and
attacking the recreation hall throughout much of
Tuesday night, on Wednesday the Interhamwe
moved to the other end of the mission complex
and attacked the small maternity ward, where
Ms. Olanta! Kayisinga, the 22-year-old student
at Kayonza, had been hiding with her extended
family since April 7.
After the arduous
struggles at the church and the recreation hall,
the 50 persons hiding in the little three-room
maternity ward where her aunt had been a mid-
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Chantal Kayisinga, whose family was killed at
the maternity ward at Rukara Parish.
Photo: USCRID. Hawk

wife were easily massacred. From morning until mid-day, the militia pulled many people out
of the crowded rooms and hacked them with
machetes. Her father, Sostain Musominare, a
retired agricultural teacher, was cut on the knees
and beaten to death. Of her immediate family
members, only Chantal and her younger sister
survived. 18 That Chantal survived is a miracle.
When we interviewed her five months later, she
was still at the hospital at Gahini. They had
hacked her ankles with a machete, so she
wouldn't be able to walk. Five months later, the
deep, ugly cuts were still healing. Once she was
on the ground, they beat her with a heavy club,
and she lost consciousness. They slashed the
back of her neck, obviously intending to finish
her off. Five months later, she still had an inchdeep wound in her neck several inches wide.
Astonishingly, her spinal cord had not been severed.
The experience of Mrs. Immaculate
Mukamurigo, the 49-year-old nurse at the dispensary, was quite different. She thinks that
only on Wednesday had the decision been made
that all the Thtsi at the parish had to be killed.
At least up to then, that had not been clear to
her. She had remained at the dispensary, tending the wounded, hiding in the dispensary toilet
when the singing and whistling of the

proaching the parish. Up to this point, whenever they came, people were wounded and
killed. But then the militiamen would withdraw.
And up to then, the Burgmeister, the local
Member of Parliament, various police and soldiers would also- come to the parish and talk
with the gathered Tutsi. Up to Wednesday,
Aprill3, seven days after the killings in Rukara
began, there were still numbers of Thtsi ensconced at the parish mission station. And there
was still something of a stand-off between the
Interhamwe and the resisting Tutsi in the main
church building.
Nurse Mukamurigo thinks that only
then was there renewed determination in Rukara
that all Tutsi at the parish had to be killed off
completely. Her reason for thinking this is the
heated debate that took place among
lnterhamwe members in front of her and her
son. He, like Angelique Umurungi, had been
hiding among the dead and wounded at the recreation hall. During that massacre, he had been
found and recognized by fonner classmates who
were now lnterhamwe. They pulled him out of
the rec room, but whether or not it was to save
him or to use him to find his mother was not yet
clear. In any event, they took him to the dispensary, which was at the other end of the mission
station from the recreation hall, and had him call
out to his mother, who was then hiding in a dispensary toilet. When she recognized his voice,
she came out of hiding. He was covered in
blood, and at first sight she thought that her son
was terribly wounded. But he assured her that
he was all right.
There then followed the bizarre argument between I nterhamwe members, in front of
the mother and son, about whether these two
Tutsi had to be killed. Some said it had to be
done. They asked the son if they should kill
him or his mother. The son replied that if that
was their thinking, they should better kill them
both.
Other Interhamwe objected. "This
woman has nursed us all our lives when we
were sick," one explained. "What is the sin for
which she must die?" he asked.
Mrs.
Mukamurigo 's defenders prevailed. They took
her and her son back to her home. But her
home had been destroyed. So they put her up
with a kindly Hutu, Mr. Mbonye-Muvunyi, who
agreed to shelter them. 19
Nurse Mukmurigo 's theory about the
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AngelUJue Umurungi, survivor ofthe
recreation room massacres at Rukara parish.
Above, Rukara dispensary.
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recent decision that all the Tutsi at the parish
had to be killed may be correct On Thursday,
April 14, when Interhamwe returned to renew
the attack against the Tutsi in the main church
building, they brought with them a larger group
of tetter anned soldiers, reportedly from
Mirambi. The soldiers used their rifles to try to
shoot through the metal door. A few bullets did
penetrate the door, killing those who were holding the door in place from inside. But still the
door held. They then tried to cut through the
door with an ax. Fmally, the metal gave out,
and the ax slashed through the door. But those
inside grabbed the ax head from inside the door
and pulled the ax into the church. They shoved
a spear out the slash hole that had been created
by the ax, nunming it through one of the surprised attackers. The fighting grew even more

desperate.
Soldiers climbed on top of the roof and
began shooting down through the roof into the
area where the defenders were guarding the
door. Now, the soldiers threw many grenades
through the windows, and the defenders died in
huge numbers. The soldiers finally pried away
a section of metal roofing directly above the
door, and began shooting down at those inside.
The people in the church thought that finally
they were finished. But the soldiers ran out of
~~ Genocide in Rwanda

ammunitio~

having blindly shot so many times

into the door and through the roof.20 When the

soldiers left around 2:00p.m., the militia withdrew from the church, as well.
On Friday, the lnterhamwe mob and the
soldiers returned. But now, on Friday, April 15,
the sounds of serious warfare between the government anny and the RPF were audible at
Rukara parish. The Interhamwe now asked
those inside to open the door and talk. Perhaps
surprisingly, after some discussion, the Tutsi
agreed to open the door. And while they were
talking, other government troops came by to
collect the soldiers that were at the parish with
the locallnterhamwe mob so that the anny units
could flee together to escape before the advancing troops of the RPF. At that point, deserted by
the soldiers, the local militiamen threw their remaining stones. and spears at the church, and
then ran away, too.21
The massacre of Tutsi at the Rukara
parish was over. When the RPF arrived the next
day,22 they found bodies strewn about in front of
the church buildings, and inside the various
buildings. Many people were still hiding about
Indeed, many of the SUIVivors were reluctant to
come out, at first believing that the soldiers were
from the government, coming to finish them off.
According to the new, RPF-installed B~eister
:for Rukara. Mr. Jean-Pierre Dusingizemungu, they

did not have the capacity to prepare graves for
the dead, so they brought soldiers from Gahini
barracks, gathered the bodies into various piles,
and cremated the decomposing corpses.
The survivors inteiViewed in AugustSeptember 1994 speak of two to three thousand deaths at Rukara parish, with only about
two hundred suiVivors, most of whom were
among those still left alive inside the main
church. 23 Foreign journalists do have additional photographs of the bodies sprawled
around the church grounds in late April. It
would be possible to inteiView another score
of suiVivors whose accounts could fill in
more details of the events at Rukara parish.
It should also be possible to obtain the confirmations of the foreign priests and nuns who
were present during the beginning parts of
the massacres. One would like even more to
interrogate Burgmeister Jean Mpambara, who
minimally would have a lot of explaining to
do. But the outlines of what happened at
Rukara are far beyond doubt. While some
killings were done during the night, many
were done in broad daylight by killers who
knew their victims. There are many survivors who easily and repeatedly can identify
far more individual killers than are ever
likely to be held responsible for their crimes.

The events at Rukara parish certainly
conform to what a leading genocide scholar has
recently characterized as the genocidal paradigm:

~.;;

At left, the Rukma parish door, with axe
gashes, bullet holes, and blood stllins. Above,
interior of church, where the roof was pried up
to allow soldiers to shoot down at those inside.
Photo: USCRID. Hawk
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• There is a sustained attack, or continuity of
attacks, by the perpetrator to physically destroy group members.
• The perpetrator is a collective or organized actor or a commander of organized actors. (Genocide is distinguishable from homicide empirically by the
fact that it is never an act of a single individual.)
• The victims are selected because they are
members of a group.
• The victims are defenseless or are killed regardless of whether they surrendered or resisted.
• The destruction of group members is undertaken with intent to kill and the murder is
sanctioned by the perpetrators.24

The course of events at Rukara parish
exemplifies the findings of the UN Security
Council's Commission of Experts for Rwanda
that "mass extenninations of Tutsis were canied
out by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned,
systematic, and methodical way.''25

•
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POSTSCRIPT: PROBLEMS OF
PREVENTION, REMEDY, AND REDRESS

DI.

In 1948, the United Nations promulgated the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention was
fmmulated in response to the opinion of the
judges at the post-World War IT Nuremberg tribunals that tenible crimes against humanity not
committed in time of war were not previously
illegal under international law. The Genocide
Convention defines "acts of genocide" and
"crimes of genocide." The Convention requires
that signatory States incorporate laws on the
prevention and punishment of genocide into
their domestic criminal codes. 111e Convention
establishes a potential avenue for the prevention
or suppression of genocide, and it posits the legal obligation that those responsible for committing genocide should be brought to justice
and punished either in the state in which the
crime occurred, or in a competent international
penal tribunal.

The refugees
camped. in Zaire
and Tanzania are
controlled by the
same political leaders and forces now
in those camps who
perpetrated the
Non-Prevention and Non-Suppression in
genocide.
Rwanda

·

Under Article VIll of the Genocide Convention,
the procedure for preventing or suppressing
genocide is that ''Any Contracting Party may
call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of
the United Nations as they consider appropriate:'
Even before the mgent need in April
1994 for concerted international action to halt
the Rwandan genocide, the situation in Rwanda
was already a matter of concern in the UN Secwity Council, the UN's most "competent organ." The Council had already dispatched peacekeeping foireS known as the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda, I(UNAMIR) to
oversee the implementation of the 1992 internationally brokered "Arusha" pear..e accord between the Rwandan government and the rebel
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)26
However, rather than building on the
established UNAMIR presence to "prevent or
suppress" the genocide, the chain of events in
Rwanda that accompanied the outbreak of the
post-April 6 massacres also led to UNAMIR 'sZ7
breakdown and its almost complete withdrawal
•
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from Rwanda 28 Tragically, the fifteen UN
Member States on the Security Council failed to
redefine, rebuild, or redeploy a UN peacekeeping presence to make a necessary "show of
force" that could have saved tens of thousands
of lives by detening government-instigated
mobs from carrying out many of the massacres.29
Thus, it was not concerted international
action that deterred or suppressed massacres in
Rwanda; rather, it was the military victory of the
RPF in the renewed warfare after the breakdown
of the cease fire and the mass killings by supporters of the old government that followed
President Habyarimanas fatal plane crash. The
RPF victory led to one of the largest refugee
flows ever recorded. Leaders of the defeated
government took roughly two million Hutu
Rwandans with them into regionally destabilizing exile in neighboring Tanzania and Zaire.
Widely televised images of death and disease in
refugee camps sparked the massive international
humanitarian intervention that had been so
tragically absent from the victims and survivors
in Rwanda itself. But despite a continuing international presence, the refugees camped in Zqire
and Tanzania are controlled by the same political leaders and forces now in those camps who
perpetrated the genocide, and who today use the
refugees, and the prospect of their repatriation
to Rwanda, as a bargaining chip in a quest for
amnesty and a return to political power. These
factors set the international political context for
dealing with the aftennath of the Rwandan
genocide.

Breaking the Cycles of Impunity and
Deterring Revenge
For literally a generation, from the 1959-60
revolution that brought the Hutu to power and
led to the initial, partial expulsion of Tutsi to
Uganda, Burundi, and elsewhere, elements of
the Hutu majority population, with complete
and total impunity, periodically massacred
members of the Tutsi minority group who remained in Rwanda No one was ever brought to
justice or punished for these killings. There
were no sanctions, or even the idea that there
should be sanctions, against such murders. This
key factor, cited by UN reports and many
Rwandans alike, enabled the Rwandan genocide.

Thus, in April 1994, when a crisis exploded over the unwillingness of the governing
Hutu political parties to implement the powersharing provisions of the Arusha peace accords,
and when the decisions were made and implemented to physically eliminate the Tutsi minority group, as such, the killings were done in
broad daylight. The killers made no attempt to
disguise or hide their identity. These were ethnically motivated murders, not punislnnents for murder. These were murders sanctioned by state and
political authorities, who indeed had gone to great
lengths to organize, prepare, and motivate elements
of the population to take these actions.
The new Rwandan government argues,
with compelling logic and passion, that there is
one way to deter future ethnically motivated political killings: end the generation-long pattern
of such killings by holding accountable and
bringing to justice those responsible for criminal
acts under international and Rwandan domestic
law. The Rwandan government also argues that
only legal action against those responsible for
these murders can deter aggrieved Rwandan
citizens, including members of the new
Rwandan armed forces, from taking the law into
their 0\\>11 hands in the form of revenge killings. 30
UN officials working to create an international tribunal also emphasize the centrality
of establishing the principle of accountability
for grave violations of international humanitarian law, including genocide, as a deterrent to future violations. Acts of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity have all been committed since the founding of the UN and the
signing of the Genocide Convention. Despite
that fact, no international criminal proceedings
have occurred since the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials following World War II. The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide has never been used or implemented to bring to justice those responsible for
these crimes. Up to the present in real life, the
Convention remains morib.md. Thus, the world
has no measure of the extent to which international
prosecutions would acUlally deter future political
authorities from resolving their internal political
difficulties through the attempted destruction of unwanted, despised or problematic ethnic, racial, religious or national groups. On the other hand, the
converse is perfectly obvious: the suspension or
non-application of legal principles and procedures
to hold accountable those who have committed

such crimes is no deterrent whatsoever.
It is hard to imagine a situation where
acts of genocide will be so massive, clear, and
both legally and politically unambiguous as
they were in Rwanda The international community failed to prevent or suppress the
Rwandan genocide while it was ~going on. If it
fails now to hold accountable and bring to justice those responsible for the genocide, the
grave ramifications will reach far beyond the
situation in Rwanda
Genocide is an international crime that
should, by its own definition, be punished under
international law. Beyond that, there are three
reasons why it important for Rwanda that international proceedings be initiated for the crimes
committed there, in addition to any criminal
proceedings that might take place at the national
level in a rebuilt Rwandan judicial system.
First, ending the cycles of impunity--without
which a genuine process of national reconciliation will be unlikely--requires that the ethnic
majority in Rwanda not perceive the punishment of those responsible for the former
government's mass murder of ethnic minorities
as "victor's justice" or state-sponsored revenge.
"World-sanctioned," not "Rwandan-victors" justice will result if an international community tribunal determines that genocide and other terrible crimes were committed and prosecutes
those most responsible. By the same token, the
new government and the Tutsi minority at the
grass roots level need to know that in the eyes of
the world and in the conscience of mankind, terrible crimes were committed in Rwanda and
that those who committed them will be indicted
and prosecuted by an international tribunal.
Second, the fonner Rwandan government officials most responsible for the genocidal acts and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda have fled the country and remain
outside the tenitocy and jurisdiction of the
Rwanda state, beyond the reach of Rwandan
law. The countries in which those most responsible now reside will more likely respond to,
and cooperate with, an international tribunal
convened under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, than to Rwandan national courts.
Thus, it is more likely that an international tribunal can successfully indict and prosecute those
who planned, organized, and ordered the massacres. Operating in isolation, Rwandan law will
only reach, and a reconstituted Rwandan justice

"...only legal action
against those responsible for these
murders can deter
aggrieved Rwandan
citizens, including
members of the new
Rwandan armed
forces,from taking
the law into their
own hands••. "
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system will only prosecute, those who did not
flee, and those who are at the very bottom of the
fonner government's murderous chain of command: the pathetic small fry--some confessing
guilt, ~orne protesting innocence--now under detention in Rwandan jails.
Third, it is probably easier and faster to
conver te an international tribunal than to rebuild
the R' vandan judicial system under prevailing
conditions in Rwanda

Ajchieving Accountability

Operating in
isolation,
Rwandan law will
only reach...those
who did notflee,
and those who are
at the very bottom
of the former
govemmenfs
murderous chain
of command.

Two major impediments hinder efforts to bring
to justice those responsible for the Rwandan
genoci :le. First, the international and national
courts necessary to initiate legal proceedings do
not ye1: exist and have to be created or re-created. Second, is the sheer nmnber of participants in the killings-as noted above, far more
than ca G possibly be brought fully to justice under
any cor teeivable circumstances. Thus, if, or when,
an inte1 national criminal tritxmal is convened and
if, or when, the Rwandan judicial system is reconstituted and reb.rilt, coordinated judgments must be
made 2bout priorities for prosecution at both the
nationa: l and international levels.

Steps Toward Convening an International
Tribunal
In contrast to the UN Security Council's floundering ;nability to prevent, deter, or suppress the
Rwand;m genocide while the massacres were
taking :place, the UN Security Council actions
n1ost essential for creating an international tribunal for grave violations of intemaljonal humanitarian l:tw in Rwanda are moving forward. But
they at1 ~ enveloped by other critical and longoverdu~: UN human rights monitoring efforts in
Rwand;t that remain mired in intra-UN bureaucratic confusion and delay.
On June 28, a 19-page report31 by a UN
Cmnmi ssion on Human Rights-appointed "Special Rapporteur," Mr. R. Degni-Segui,32 examined the nature of the human rights violations in
Rwand(t with specific reference to the provisions of the Genocide Convention. Degni-Segui
concluded that acts of genocide had been committed in Rwanda, along with additional violations of human rights conventions that are

a

Genocide in Rwanda

"binding on the Rwandan State" and other grave
violations of international humanitarian law.
The report recommended the establishment of a
reinforced team of human rights observers in
Rwanda, and that:
Pending the establishment of a permanenJ
international criminal cow-t, the United
Nations sJwuld establish an ad hoc international tribwzal to hear the evidence and
judge the guilty parties or, alternatively,
should extend the jurisdiction of the inJernational tribwzal on war crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia. 33

Only the UN Security Council itself,
acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, can
establish an international tribunal whose determinations are binding on all UN Member States.
Immediately after the Spxial ~rteur's Reports were published, on July 1, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 935 urging the
UN Secretary-General to appoint an impartial
Commission of Experts on Rwanda The action
followed a precedent established when the UN
created an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Commission was charged with examining the facts and legalities of the Rwandan
situation, and to provide the Secretary Genernl.
with its conclusions regarding the evidence and
perpetration of grave violations of international humanitarian law, including genocide.
The Secretary-General's Report to the
Security Council of July 26,34 which appointed
the Expert Commissioners (Mr. Atsu-Koffi
Amega, a former President of the Supreme
Court of Togo; Mrs. Habi Dieng, a former Attorney General of Guinea; and Mr. Salifu
Fomba, a law professor in Mali who is a member of the UN International Law Commission)
further mandated the Commission of Experts to
review and update infonnation available from
all sources, carry out its own investigations in
Rwanda, draw its own conclusions on the evidence of violations of international hwnanitarian
law including genocide, and determine whether

and to what extent individuals may be held responsible for having committed such violations.
The Commission of Experts convened
in Geneva and began its work in mid-August
Its final report is to be submitted by November
30. The Commission of Experts urgently issued
a preliminary report on September 29, to facili-

tate earlier Security Council consideration of establishing a oibunal for Rwanda The Commissioners reviewed a wide variety of reporting,
from the Special Rapporteur, UN Member
States, UN agencies, other intergovernmental
bodies, NGOs, 35 and from both sides in the
armed conflict. The Commissioners visited
Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania from late August
to mid-September, prior to the September 29
publication of its Preliminary Report.
The 35-page Preliminary Report discussed the "concerted, planned, systematic and
methodical nature of the criminal acts," committed by the Rwandan Government soldiers and
Hutu militia against the Tutsi of Rwanda 36
(The Commission of Experts Preliminary Report has a one sentence notation of the massacre
at Rukara, described in some detail above in this
USCR investigation. 37) The Report also states
that grounds exist for concluding that Tutsi elements committed acts against Hutu individuals
that, while not amounting to genocide, included
assassinations, summary executions, breaches of
international humanitarian law, and crimes
against humanity. 38 The Commission noted that
it had just received reports of Rwanda Patriotic
Front violations of the right to life committed
during August and September 1994, and that the
Secretary General had asked the Commission to
further investigate these reports. 39
The Preliminary Report devoted eleven
pages to an analysis of individual responsibility
in international law as applied to the situation in
Rwanda: particularly violations of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 1977 additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions relating to violations against the civilian JX>pulation in time of armed conflict; crimes
against humanity; and geoocide. Regarding genocide, the Preliminary Report noted that,
The Commission of Expens has determined tluzt there are ample grounds to conclude that every provision laid out in Article III of the Genocide Convention
[genocide crimes include the killings themselves; conspiracy to commit genocide; incitement to commit genocide, the attempt
to commit genocide, and complicity in
genocide] have been violated in Rwanda in
the period 6 April to 15 1uly in respect of a
specific ethnic group as such. 40

The Report considers the relative merits
of "municipal" prosecutions, i.e. Rwandan
courts for international crimes, versus international prosecutions for international crimes. It
finds that international prosecutions are preferable, citing independence, objectivity, and impartiality and the perception (both in Rwanda
and abroad) that convictions will have been
The Commissioners also
fairly reached.
stressed that the gravity of the Rwandan violations extend beyond Rwanda, and that as a matter of peace and security affecting the international community as a whole,
the developmen! of international criminal
law to better deter such crimes from being
perpetrated in the future not only in
Rwanda, but anywhere, would be best fostered by international prosecution rather
than by domestic courts.41

The Commission of Experts strongly
recommends to the Security Council that it
take all necessary and effective action to
ensure that the individuals responsible for
the serious violations of human rights in
Rwanda during the armed conflict triggered on 6 April 1994 are brought to justice before an independent and impartial
international criminal tribuna/." 42

The Commission of Experts offers
three reasons for expanding the competence and
jurisdiction of the recently created International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to handle
prosecution of Rwandan cases, rather than to
create a separate ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda: 43
(1) administrative efficiency, (2) the deterrent
value of the development of international criminal justice, and (3) the consistency of intetpretation and application of international law. On
this matter, the Commission of Experts for
Rwanda concurs with concerns raised by the
United States. From the time of the UN's
founding up to just a year ago when the
Yugoslav Tribunal was created, the UN had not
been able to bring into being an international
criminal tribunal as part of the international order. Thus, no experience or precedents exists
for deteiiDining how to conduct such trials or
how to intetpret or apply various international
laws. If two separate, independent tribunals
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were 1:0 come into operation siinultaneously, a
considerable risk exists 1that different
prosec utorial standards and procedures and differing interpretation and applications of international law would result from two unrelated sets
of pro:;ecutors and judges.
There are other practical matters. The
Comrnission of Experts for Yugoslavia took
nearly two years to figure out the structure and
rules of procedure that detennine how such a
criminal court would work. Appointing judges
and finding a chief Prosecutor was another
lengthy UN process. But these elements are
now irt place. The Dutch govennment has provided court rooms in the Hague and built a
prison for the Yugoslav tribunal. A separate tribunal ;br Rwanda would duplicate these efforts,
at coru;iderable time and expense.44 Even while
1the Commission of Experts for Rwanda recommends that the Yugoslav Tribunal, about to get
underway in Holland, be expanded to handle
R wanclan cases as well, the Commission notes
that, e~ren if the legal framework, structure, and
persont1el of the Yugoslav tribunal are used for
R wanC.a, the competence and jurisdiction of the
triburuJl are a different issue from the site where
trials c:>uld be held. While this would be a matter for the Court itself to decide, if and when the
Securi1y Council creates such a tribunal, the
Commission of Experts explicitly notes that
no inconsistency would in any way exist
between having cases brought under the
jurisdiction of an international criminal
tril. 'una/ and between having the trials conducted by this tribunal in the territory of
Rwanda.... " 45

A very strong case can be made that
some trials should be conducted and verdicts
announced in Rwanda However, reportedly, it
may be the case that elements of the new
Rwandan government prefer that a completely
separat~ tribunal be brought into being and located entirely within Rwanda 46 (Elements of
the Rwandan government may also have reservations about the projected time frame for the jurisdicticn of an international t:ribma.
Rwanda
continues to sit on the Security Council of the
UN, wllere the decisions on these matters will
be maC.e (as the fonner government did when
the UN was stymied in its respon.r)(! to the genocide lfu.t was occurring.)
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Meanwhile, the Commission of Experts
is continuing to investigate the Rwandan violations, in preparation of its final report of November 30. That report will be a much more
thorough factual and legal analysis than was
possible for the September 29 Preliminary Report At least a dozen persons seconded to the
Commission of Experts from UN Member States
are now conducting investigations inside Rwanda.
In early September, as a pennanent
member of the Security Council, the United
States began circulating draft amendments to
the Statutes of the Tribunal for the fonner Yugoslavia (which the Security Council had approved in Resolutions 808 and 827). It also circulated a draft resolution on Rwanda that would
enable the international prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, or by Rwandans in the territory
of neighboring States, since April 1, 1994. That
resolution would allow the Secretary General to
arrange urgently for a prosecutorial staff for the
Rwandan cases and to prepare for the election
of additional judges. The draft resolution urges
Member States and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to contribute funds,
equipment, and services the International Trirunal. And the draft resolution \VOuld "decide;' under
the UN's Olapter 7 powers, that States
shall cooperate fully with the International

Tribunal ...and take any measure necessary
under their domestic law to implement the
provisions of the present resolution and the
Statute.

This important provision fairly mandates the States to which those individuals most
responsible for the Rwandan genocide have fled
to cooperate with the Tribunal in arresting and
extraditing indicted suspects.
If the Security Council does choose to
expand the tribunal previously created for
Yugoslavia,whose structure and rules of procedure already exists, it is possible to envision
how the process would work for Rwanda The
Yugoslav Tribunal has two trial chambers of
three judges each, an appeals chamber with five
judges, a court staff called the "registry," and a
prosecutorial staff headed by a Chief Prosecutor
and Deputy Prosecutor that would operate fairly
independently of the judges. The U.S. proposal

would add an additional two trial chambers with
another three judges each. The UN General Assembly elects the judges based on the candidates suggested by the Security Council. The
Prosecutorial staff, the Court Registry, and the
Tribunal budge~7 would be enlarged to handle
the tribunal's caseload. Because the Rwandan
cases derive from Francophone Africa, geographic balance, regional representation, and appropriate language and legal qualifications
would be factors in adding judges and
prosecutorial staff. The United States has proposed slight alterations in the Tribunal's legal
mandate to ensure that the Courts' handling of
war crirnes and crimes against humanity take
into account the Rwandan situation.
If the mandate of the former Yugoslavia
tribunal is expanded, international legal proceedings against the perpetrators of the Rwanda
genocide could begin fairly quickly. 48 Consultations could begin right away between the international Prosecutor's office and Rwandan authorities regarding the priority targets for
criminal indictments and the ca.'Cs of prisoners

The massacre at Gahini.

presendy detained iil Rwandan prisons.
More importan~ the process could begin for indicting those former higher-echelon
Rwandan officials who led the massacres, and
the highest level political leaders who planned
and ordered the killings but who fled Rwanda,
and who now reside outside Rwanda's territory
and jurisdiction. If the Judges of the International Tribunal concur with the September 29
Repo:rt4 9 of the Commission of Experts for
Rwanda that not only were acts of genocide
committed in Rwanda, but also that provisions
prohibiting conspiracy to commit genocide,
public incitement to commit genocide, the attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in
genocide were all violated as well in Rwanda
between April 6 and July 15 in respect to a specific ethnic group, then the international tribunal
would be able to indict for "conspiracy" to
commit genocide the political leaders who
planned the massacres and gave the orders to
carry out the massacres. The directors and
.broadcasters of Radio Mille Collenes, which
broadcast admonitions to the public to fill the

Photo: Father Oswald Rudakemwa
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graves, should be indictable. for "incitement" to
commit genocide. And the leaders of the
I nterkvnwe mobs that wielded the machetes
and clubs should be indictable for the "attempt"
to carr. mit genocide.
The President of the Yugoslav Tribunal
has already explained how the itndictment process '"·auld work. 50 First, the Chief Prosecutor
prepar~~s an indicnnent. Second, a judge from
one of the Trial Chambers confirms the indictment 'nd issues an arrest warrant. (The details
of every indicnnent will be made public).
Third, the arrest warrant will•be sent to the State
in wh[ch the accused was last known to be
present. (That State is required to notify the Tribunal if it is unable to execute the warrant.)
Fourth, if the state fails to execute the warrant
promptly, the Tribunal will attempt to inform
the accused of the indicnnent by putting notices
in appropriate newspapers. Fifth, if at that
point, the accused person still does not come
into th~ custody of the Tribunal, the indicnnent
and aTI of its supporting evidence will be submitted in full to one of the three judge Trial
Chambers. If the Judges determine that a prima
facie case exists, an international arrest warrant
will be issued to all member states.
The Tribunal is to report to the Security
Council if the noncooperation of a Member
State binders an arrest warrant. The Security
Council has already prepared the groundwork
for po: ;sible sanctions against noncooperating
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states, which could be important if Zaire, for example, would not cooperate in arresting potentially indicted persons residing in the huge
Rwandan refugee camps there.
Thus, whHe the Tribunal will not contrials
in
absentia,
international
duct
criminalization can occur,in effect, even if the
indicted persons cannot be tried. According to
the President of the Tribunal:
... the steps we have included, and which we
are prepared to implement, will go a long
way towards bringing those persons to
justice or effectively imprisoning them
within the borders of a State which will be
regarded as a pariah among nations. 51

Obviously, many steps are necessary to reach
this endpoint

***
In reviewing the problems and prospects
for the war crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Helsinki Watch concluded,
The international corrununity has lacked
the will to bring about a cessation of war
crimes and crimes against humanity in
Croatia and Bosnia; the least it can do is
to bring the criminals to justice.52

The same can certainly be said about Rwanda,
as well.

topography, Rwanda is known as the "land of a thousand

hills." The Rwandan c:apital of Kigali is rather like an
tmbuilt-up San Francisco, an tmdulating cluster of steep

hills.

s Musonera is short (roughly 5' 5") and has a rounded
nose. In legend and mythology, and to a lesser extent in
reality, the archetypical Tutsi is tall and slender, with an
aquiline or long nose, while supposedly Hutu are short,
stocky, and with a flat or more rmmded nose. In reality,
ethnic designation in Rwanda is as much a ftmction of
"class" as it is "tribe." Many Rwandans cannot be recognized as either Huru or Tutsi, which is why the government retained the use of '"tribal specific" identity cards.
6

3

UN Dec. E/CN.4!1995n, p. 6.

4

A "ceU" (cellule in French) is thebasic political administrative anit in Rwanda, roughly equivalent to an American urban precinct or, in rural areas, a village. A "cell" is
also called a "hill" because it, literally, is a hill. Due to its
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Formally, lmpusamugambii "those who have the same
goal," or /nJerhaJnwe, "those who act together," were the
''youth wing" or "militia"' of President Habyarimana' s political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for
Democracy and Development (MRND). They were generally tmeducated, lDlemployed or semi-employed yolDlg
men, armed by the extremist parties, around a core of

poorly paid local thugs. The normal use of the word "militia" connotes far too much organization. discipline, or
training for these young men. lnterhamwe has also acquired generic usage as a ''Tutsi-attacking mob."
Throughout this report, the terms "lnterhamwe," "militia," and "mob" refer to this MRND "youth wing." The
/nterhamwe had two bosses, the Presidential Guard
(when they were around) or local political leaders. It is
clear from the descriptions of the survivors that the
/nterhamwe functioned like mobs. Ten armed UN soldiers posted as guards at either of these sites could surely
have stopped the killing entirely. These vagabond teenagers with machetes and clubs would not have challenged
uniformed men with blue hats and guns.

The more salient fact is that, after killing eleven and driving off the cattle, the mob did not rerum for two days to
continue the killings.
16 According to Sister Veneranda, important parishioners
who led the /nterhamwe attacks at the church included:
Jean Tpaumbara, Jean Bosco Rukundo, Mr. Ruribunmdi,
Mr. Ngbonziza, Paul Thujyambere, Francois Nyiraluku.
Jean Claud Nkuruyija, Mr. Gasaugura, Jean Gihana, and

M. Ruabikinza.
17 A gaping hold on the side of the metal door frame was
plainly visible when, after hearing Ms. Umurungi' s testimony, the USCR mission made its second visit to Rukara
Parish.

7

Survivors interviewed in both of the case studies presented in this report gave several reasons for staying inside the parish grounds and buildings, even when they
knew they would be attacked. First, the streets and roads
outside were even more dangerous. With or without
Tutsi ID cards, they would have surely been killed outside the churches. They cited, as well, their hope for
safety in numbers, and thought that their best hope lay in
remaining inside the parish property, on holy ground and
with foreign priests to protect them.
8

See footnote 4.

9

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR), which had been earlier sent to Rwanda by
the UN Security Council to observe the implementation
of the Arusha peace accord between the Rwandan government and the rebel force known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Major Ryszard subsequently returned
to Poland. This account is from the testimony of Major
Maczka, who remains on duty with UNAMIR.

10

The only discrepancy between Musonera's account
and those of the two foreign observers cited here is in the
numbers of participants in these events, both with respect
to victims and perpetrators.
11
The original negatives were sent back to Poland for
processing. The only pictures mailed to Kigali were
given to UN human rights officials who took them to
Geneva for duplication.

18 Other immediate family members killed at the maternity ward include Berthe Mukaysinga, Odette
Musantiwabo, Jean Marie Vjamney Hodari, Liliose
Mwentekati, Uwimana, Umutone, Bizimana, Bamuyesi,
andGatesi.

!9 Mr. Mbonye-Muvunyi, nonetheless, fled to Tanzania.
along with most of the area Hutu after the RPF took over
in Rukara. While he had not killed, his sons had been
/nterhamwe, and he was afraid that the RPF would kill
him too, according to Nurse Mukamurigo.
20

After hearing Andrew Kabarira's testimony, the USCR
mission returned to the church and witnessed the bullet
holes in the roof, the ripped off sheet roofing, and the
gash in the metal door.

21

Some of them may not have gotten too far. Just after
the RPF takeover at Rukara. when foreign jomnalists (including a Kampala-based, free-lance journalist who has
written a number of reports for USCR) came to the parish, among the dead bodies strewn about the parish was a
noticeable pile of short young men whose anns had been
tied behind their backs. None of the Tutsi survivors at
Rukara interviewed by USCR in August-September described killings in that fashion.
22

When the killings in Rukara began, nine days earlier,
according to the new RPF leaders for Rukara comnume, the
RPF troops were more than one hundred kilometers away.
23

12

"Commune" is the Rwandan administrative equivalent
of a "county" in the United States.

13
'Prefecture" is the Rwandan administrative equivalent
of a "state" in the United States.

Without identifying its source of information, the September 29 Preliminary Report of the UN Commission of
Experts cites the massacre of 500 Tutsi at the Catholic
mission at Rukara (para. 63, p. 15). All of the Rukara
survivors USCR interviewed (independy of each other)
mentioned either two or three thousand deaths.
24

14

According to Kabarira, this group of militiamen was
led by Francois Nyirahuku, a teacher and local president
of the extremist CDR party; Mr. Rukundo, headmaster of
a local primary school; Paul Mujambere, a carpenter; Mr.
Magoro, the Responsible of Kinunga cell; Mr. Nkurayiga,
an accountant at the Rukara Commune office; and a peasant farmer known as Munyagihe.

Helen Fein, "Discriminating Genocide from War
Crimes," Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy, Vol. 22, No.1, Fall1993.
~ Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of

Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council
Resolution 935, September29, 1994, p. 10.
26

15

USCR did not ask how the survivors actually knew
that the militiamen ate steak and roast beef for two days.

See U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, "Exile
from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion," February
1991.
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Caused in large part by the withdrawal of the Belgian
contingent following the deaths of ten Belgian peacekeepers who were with Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, who had been deliberately and personally targeted for immediate execution--a situation that
differed substantially from the mass killings of etlmic minority group by the poorly armed government-organized
mobs that followed for the next several weeks.
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Paragraph 75, page 19.
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UN Doc. S/1994!879
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Including the U.S. Commiuee for Refugees.
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Item B, pages 10-17.

n Paragraph 63, page 15.
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Ironically, one of the difficulties was that, at the same
time, the Rwandan government, which was committing
the genocide, was itself one of the revolving, nonpermanent members of the Security Council, and continued to
participate in UN deliberations over what to do about
Rwanda Another difficulty was the initial misperceptions in
some UN policy circles that what was happening was communal violence resulting from an explosion of ancient
tribal hatreds, rather than a governmentally planned and
directed mass murder designed to retain political power.
Another complicating factor, given present U.S. predominance in the Security Council, was the coincidental arrival at the UN of the Presidential Decision 25, a wellconsidered U.S. (Somalia experience-driven) policy
memoranda designed to bring about better, more careful,
long-term planning for more effective UN peacekeeping
operations, but which arrived at the very moment when
what was even more efficacious was decisive action in
the face of messy, fast-moving events in Rwanda.

29

Unlike other peacekeeping operations elsewhere, in
Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping troops were not themselves targeted. The few instances where a handful of the
remaining UNAMIR forces did maintain a presence at
sites where large numbers of Tutsi had· sought refuge, the
militia backed off and did not attack.
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Paragraph 82, page 17.

39

Paragraph 83, pages 17-18.

-«~ Paragraph 115, page 28. Also Paragraphs 137-139,
page34.
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Paragraph 129, page 32.
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Paragraph 141, page 34.
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Pages 31-32.
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It is also very much on the minds of UN legal officials
that the expansion of the competence of the Yugoslavia
tribt.m.al is a large step toward the Security Council creating a possible ongoing international tribunal with vastly
wider jurisdiction than would likely be accomplished
through the process of creating a pennanent international
tribunal through the treaty ratification by UN Member
States, a process that would allow many States to severely
restrict and delimit the jurisdiction of any such tribunal.
45

Paragraph 126, page 31.
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SeeNew York Times, October 7, Page 19.

30

The new government is arresting some Tutsi who have
engaged in revenge killings by private citizens. One such
person was interviewed in Kibungo by the USCR mission. There are also now additional allegations of revenge killings by RPF forces. (The USCR mission saw
imprisoned RPF soldiers, but did not learn what they are
charged with.)

47

Importantly, nongovernmental organizations are explicitly enabled to submit evidence to the Prosecutors.
NGOs can be called upon to testify. NGOs can also submit amicus curiae briefs to the Court at the Trial and appeal stages.
48

31

UN Doc. #E/CN. 4/1995n. Excerpts from this report
were published as a News Bulletin by USCR on July 12,
1994.

The International Tribtmal would be funded, upon approval of the budget by the General Assembly, as an integral part of the UN system.
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Op.Cit., paragraphs 114 and 115, p. 28.
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The Commission on Human Rights is a Geneva-based
UN political body, comprised of 53 UN Member States,
which reports to the Economic and Social Council, a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly. The staff Secretariat of the Commission, the UN Human Rights Center, and its agents (generally referred to as "Special
Rapporteurs" or "Special Representatives'') can only conduct investigations of, or prepare reports about, human
rights violations when explicitly enabled so to do by a
resolution of the Commission, passed by a majority of its
members voting under instructions of their respective
governments. Normally, the Commission meets for only
six weeks a year in February-March. To obtain the necessary mandate for the UN investigation a special session
of the Human Rights Commission, its third ever, was
convened on May 25.
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